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“YOU SHOULD HAVE KNOWN”: THE NEED FOR
EVIDENTIARY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS IN IMMIGRATION
COURT
Marisa Moore Apel

I. INTRODUCTION
Under United States immigration law, immigrants subject to removal
proceedings may apply for asylum if they face severe threats of violence
or harm in their home countries.1 When applicants are successful, they are
considered legal refugees and are protected from deportation.2
Additionally, these immigrants are authorized to work in the U.S.,
provided a more direct path to citizenship, and granted rights to petition
for family members abroad to join them.3 Obtaining asylum, however, is
often difficult for immigrants.
Every year in the U.S., increasingly more individuals facing
deportation seek asylum.4 In April 2020, United States immigration court
dockets reached an all-time high, reporting over 1.17 million open
removal cases.5 These cases had been pending for an average of 734 days
and were not yet resolved.6 The significant backlog in immigration
courts—in addition to the high-stakes nature of asylum cases—places
immeasurable strain on applicants and their families. Unlike the criminal
justice system where the government appoints a lawyer for indigent
defendants, asylum and removal proceedings require immigrants to either
retain private counsel or proceed pro se.7 In 2016, the American
Immigration Council reported that just under two-thirds of immigrants
involved in removal proceedings chose the latter.8
Immigrants choosing to appear alone before an Immigration Judge
1. Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, I’m Afraid to Go Back: A Guide to Asylum,
Withholding of Removal, and the Convention Against Torture, IMMIGRANT JUSTICE (May 2013),
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/FIRRP%20Asylum_WOR_CAT-Guide2013_modified.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Asylum in the United States, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Jun. 2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
research/access-counsel-immigration-court. Approximately 37 percent of all U.S. immigrants secured
legal representation in their removal cases. Whereas two-thirds of non-detained immigrants acquired legal
counsel, only 14 percent of detained immigrants were able to do so. Id.
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(“IJ”) often fail to achieve their desired legal outcome.9 The length and
complexity of U.S. immigration proceedings, language barriers, and
remote locations of many immigrant detention facilities make it difficult
for asylum-seekers to effectively present their case to a judge, even if they
have access to persuasive evidence that supports their claims.10 One
common challenge arises when an IJ identifies a need for corroborating
evidence during asylum proceedings. Although the Third and Ninth
Circuits have held that an immigrant must be given notice of the need for
corroborating evidence and an opportunity to provide it before a judge
renders a final decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”),
joined by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits,
does not require notice.11 The minority circuits argue that an immigrant’s
due process rights are undermined when notice of the need for
corroboration is not provided. The majority circuits and BIA, however,
argue that preserving efficiency in an already backlogged court system is
more important.
This Casenote considers the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in
Wambura v. Barr,12 which expands upon the majority circuits’ position
that notice of the need for corroborating evidence is not required.13 Part
II of this Article contextualizes the process for defensive asylum within
the U.S. and reviews the legislative history and case law upon which the
majority and minority circuit positions are built. Part II also summarizes
Wambura. Finally, Part III weighs the merits of both circuit positions
through the lens of Wambura and concludes that the minority approach
adopted by the Third and Ninth Circuits is preferable but should be
construed narrowly.

9. Id.
10. Id.; Cristobal Ramón & Lucas Reyes, Language Access in the Immigration System: A Primer,
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (Sep. 18, 2020), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/language-access-inthe-immigration-system-a-primer/.
11. See Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 2015); Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 376
(4th Cir. 2020); Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011); Saravia v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d
729, 731 (3d Cir. 2018); Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009); Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d
757 (5th Cir. 2020); Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2015); Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521 (7th
Cir. 2008); Uzodinma v. Barr, 951 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2020).
The B.I.A. is an important part of the Department of Justice and “is the highest administrative
body for interpreting and applying United States immigration laws.” Board of Immigration Appeals, THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/boardof-immigration-appeals. The B.I.A. is primarily tasked with reviewing certain decisions of IJs and district
directors of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Id. Its decisions are binding on all IJs and
DHS officials, unless a decision is overruled by a federal court or attorney general. Id. The vast majority
of B.I.A. decisions are reviewable by federal circuits and the Supreme Court of the United States. Id.
12. 980 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2020).
13. Wambura, 980 F.3d at 376.
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II. BACKGROUND
This Part will first provide an overview of the various processes for
asylum and other legal defenses available to immigrants subject to
removal proceedings. Next, it will consider the legislative history of 8
U.S.C.A. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(ii), which is the present statutory authority
regarding whether notice of the need for corroboration must be provided
to an immigrant before an IJ renders a final decision on asylum. Finally,
this Part will discuss how U.S. circuit courts reached competing
understandings of 8 U.S.C.A 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) with respect to the need
for corroboration.
A. The U.S. Process for Asylum
There are two main processes for immigrants within the U.S. to obtain
asylum.14 First, an immigrant may affirmatively apply through the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, a division of the Department of
Homeland Security, within one year of her most recent arrival to the
United States.15 Second, when an immigrant is subject to ongoing
removal proceedings, she must defensively apply by filing an application
for asylum with an IJ at the Executive Office for Immigration Review in
the Department of Justice.16
In order to qualify for affirmative or defensive asylum, an applicant
must first demonstrate that she meets the legal definition of a refugee
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).17 The INA provides
that one is considered a “refugee” when there is a serious threat of harm
preventing her from returning home that stems from her race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group.18
An applicant must then prove that her fear of persecution in her home
country is “well- founded.”19 In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court of the United States
clarified this standard by explaining that an immigrant must demonstrate
there is at least a ten percent chance that she will be harmed if she returns
home.20 Two other forms of protection in addition to defensive asylum
14. Asylum in the United States, supra note 3.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Victoria Neilson et al., Asylum Manual, IMMIGRATION EQUALITY (2007),
https://immigrationequality.org/asylum/asylum-manual/asylum-law-basics-2/asylum-law-basicselements-of-asylum-law/.
18. Id.
19. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987).
20. Id. at 421.
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may be sought from an IJ: withholding of removal or protection under the
United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).21 These processes,
however, place even stricter requirements on the applicant. In order to
prevail on a claim for withholding of removal, one must show that the
threat of substantial harm is more likely than not or more than fifty percent
likely.22 A successful invocation of CAT is reserved for the most serious
cases. To prevail on a CAT claim, an immigrant must show that it is more
likely than not she will be tortured or killed if returned to her home
country.23 Therefore, the threshold requirement of harm is much greater
under CAT compared to asylum or withholding of removal.24
Although many attributes of these defenses to removal are the same,
they each harbor unique requirements and provide the applicant with
different benefits. For example, if one has a criminal history or a previous
deportation order, she may be disqualified from applying for asylum,
which is the most favorable form of protection for immigrants.
Nevertheless, she could still qualify for withholding of removal or
protection under CAT.25 Furthermore, unlike asylum or withholding of
removal, one does not have to demonstrate that the likelihood of harm is
related to one’s race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or social
group in order to prevail under CAT.26 Instead, one only needs to
demonstrate the perpetrator is a government official.27 Generally,
applicants apply pursuant to all statutes under which they might qualify
to have the best chance of avoiding deportation or refoulement.28
B. Corroboration Under the REAL ID Act of 2005
Adverse credibility and corroboration standards relating to pleas for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT are set forth
in 8 U.S.C.A. 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), which falls under the REAL ID Act of
2005 (the “REAL ID Act”). Prior to its passage, there was no explicit
statutory authority regarding how an asylum applicant’s credibility should
be weighed or whether an IJ could require corroborating evidence of
credible testimony.29 The Ninth Circuit had previously held that an
applicant’s testimony must be deemed credible unless an adjudicator
21. Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, supra note 1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; Asylum in the United States, supra note 3.
26. Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, supra note 1.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Wambura v. Barr, where an immigrant applied for asylum, withholding of removal,
and protection under CAT to maximize his chances against deportation. 980 F.3d 365, 376 (4th Cir. 2020).
29. Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 519 n.2 (B.I.A. 2015).
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identified explicit reasons for an adverse credibility finding.30 Other
circuits, however, held that an adverse credibility finding could be based
on factors such as an applicant’s demeanor, inconsistencies between or
among witnesses and evidence, or a testimony’s lack of specificity.31
The REAL ID Act narrowly settled this debate by codifying that an
applicant could meet her burden of proof through testimony alone, but
only if an IJ determines that the testimony “is credible, is persuasive, and
refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a
refugee.”32 Moreover, an IJ may require corroborating evidence for
otherwise credible testimony, unless the evidence is not readily obtainable
by the applicant.33 However, circuit courts now disagree on whether the
REAL ID Act requires an IJ to notify an applicant of the need for
corroboration and afford her an opportunity to provide it before rendering
a final decision.34 In relevant part, the REAL ID Act states:
In determining whether the applicant has met the applicant’s burden, the
trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of
record. Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide
evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence
must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.35

According to Congress, the purpose of the Real ID Act was to “respond
to terrorist abuse of [U.S.] asylum laws by amending the INA to limit
fraud.”36 As a consequence, the Act made it harder for those seeking
asylum to satisfy burden of proof requirements. Congress also noted,
however, that many immigrants may be incapable of corroborating their
otherwise credible testimonies through no fault of their own.37 To address
this concern, Congress specified that a lack of corroborating evidence
should not disqualify an applicant for asylum when the evidence itself is
not reasonably available to the applicant.38
In the Real ID Act’s corroboration provision, Congress further noted
that the standard was based on the BIA’s decision in Matter of S-M-J-,
where the BIA held:
An applicant [for asylum] should provide supporting evidence, both of

30. See Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 884 (9th Cir. 2004).
31. Michael J. Garcia et al., IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE REAL
ID ACT OF 2005, U.S. CONG. RES. SERV. (May 25, 2005), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32754.pdf.
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
33. Id.
34. See Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 373 (4th Cir. 2020).
35. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
36. H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 161 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 290-91.
37. H.R. Rep. No. 109-72 at 165.
38. Id.
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general country conditions and of the specific facts sought to be relied on
by the applicant, where such evidence is available. If such evidence is
unavailable, the applicant must explain its unavailability and the
Immigration Judge must ensure that the applicant’s explanation is included
in the record.39

Because Matter of S-M-J- does not explicitly mention that an IJ must
provide advance notice of the need for corroboration, many circuit courts
concluded that Congress did not intend to place this requirement on an
IJ.40 Additionally, in 2015, the BIA adopted this understanding of the
REAL ID Act’s corroboration provision in Matter of L-A-C-.41 Recently,
the Fourth Circuit heavily relied upon Matter of L-A-C- when deciding in
line with the majority circuits.42 Other circuits accord less weight to the
BIA’s decision and instead reason that the REAL ID Act’s statutory
construction and practical implications suggest that Congress intended for
IJs to provide applicants with notice of the need for corroboration.43
1. The Minority Interpretation
In Ren v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit held that the REAL ID Act
unambiguously requires that an IJ not only provide immigrants with
notice of the need for corroboration but also the opportunity to provide
evidence of corroboration.44 Ren was a Chinese immigrant who entered
the U.S. on a temporary, non-immigrant visa after he was allegedly
tortured by the Chinese government for practicing Christianity.45 Once in
the U.S., he applied for asylum, and an asylum officer subsequently
initiated removal proceedings against him.46 After Ren testified to the
court, the IJ continued the case so that Ren could obtain the following
corroborating evidence: a bail receipt to prove his arrest in China,
testimony from his pastor regarding the authenticity of his faith, and a
certificate documenting his baptism in the U.S.47 At the next hearing, Ren
failed to provide any of the requested evidence.48 The IJ therefore denied

39. Id. at 166; In Re S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 1997).
40. See Wambura, 980 F.3d at 376; Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2020); Gaye v.
Lynch, 788 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2015); Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2008); Uzodinma v.
Barr, 951 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2020).
41. 26 I&N Dec. at 527.
42. See Wambura, 980 F.3d at 374.
43. See Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011); Saravia v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d
729, 737 (3d Cir. 2018).
44. 648 F.3d at 1091-92.
45. Id. at 1081-82.
46. Id. at 1083.
47. Id. at 1090.
48. Id.
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his plea for asylum, and Ren appealed.49
The Ninth Circuit held that “a plain reading of the statute’s text makes
clear that an [IJ] must provide an applicant with notice and an opportunity
to either produce the evidence or explain why it is unavailable” before
rendering a final decision.50 To support this interpretation, the court
emphasized the statute’s use of future-oriented and imperative language.
For example, the statute says “should provide” instead of “should have
provided” and “must be provided” instead of “must have been
provided.”51 According to the Ninth Circuit, this language does not
suggest retroaction.52 Rather, it evinces Congress’s clear intent to give
applicants for asylum notice and a future opportunity to provide
corroborating evidence.53 As a practical concern, the Ninth Circuit further
wrote that “it would make no sense to ask whether the applicant can obtain
the [corroborating evidence] unless he is to be given the chance to do
so.”54 In other words, the REAL ID Act’s directive for immigrants who
fail to corroborate their testimony to explain themselves would lack
substance if they were not first given notice and an opportunity to provide
the evidence.
Based on this interpretation of the REAL ID Act’s corroboration
provision, the Ninth Circuit held that Ren was afforded proper notice and
opportunity.55 The IJ requested specific pieces of evidence from him.56 In
order to give Ren enough time to collect the evidence, the IJ continued
the case for approximately five months.57 Because these steps were taken,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the IJ’s ruling that Ren failed to meet his
burden of proof and denied his petition for asylum.58
The Third Circuit has since re-emphasized the due process concerns
brought out by Ren’s interpretation of the REAL ID Act.59 In Saravia v.
Attorney General of the United States,60 the court wrote that the
opportunity “to supply evidence or explain why it is not available can only
occur before the IJ rules on the applicant’s petition,” and “to decide
otherwise is illogical temporally and would allow for ‘gotcha’

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1091.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1093.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Saravia v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d 729, 738 (3d Cir. 2018).
Id.
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conclusions in IJ opinions.”61 Furthermore, the Third Circuit argued that
meaningful judicial review can only occur when an IJ gives notice of the
need for corroboration and an opportunity to provide it.62
Although the Third and Ninth Circuits interpret the REAL ID Act as
providing asylum applicants with added protection in Immigration Court,
the majority circuits and BIA disagree. The Fourth Circuit recently
confronted the issue.
2. The Majority Interpretation
Ten years after the passage of the REAL ID Act, in Matter of L-A-C-,
the BIA concluded that the REAL ID Act did not require an IJ to provide
an immigrant with notice of the need for corroborating evidence and an
opportunity to provide such evidence before rendering a final decision.63
Matter of L-A-C- involved a Guatemalan immigrant who entered the U.S.
in 2004 without following proper immigration procedures.64 Four years
later, he was deported.65 In 2008, he again entered the U.S. without
authorization, leading to his second deportation in 2012.66 Less than a
year later, he returned to the U.S., and the Department of Homeland
Security brought removal proceedings against him for a third time.67
Because his prior deportations disqualified him from asylum, he applied
for withholding of removal and protection under CAT.68 He alleged that
his political opinions and membership with the Democratic Christian
Union political party made him vulnerable to governmental persecution.69
Specifically, he testified that two different mayors of his hometown
threatened and persecuted him between 2004 and 2012 because of his
political activities as a teacher and financial support for his father’s
political endeavors.70
Despite having obtained counsel, the applicant did not provide
corroborating evidence that he was an active member of the Democratic
Christian Union, worked as a teacher in Guatemala, or sent money to his
father.71 When asked why, he claimed that the evidence was either

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 737-38.
Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 527.
Id. at 517.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Id. at 525.
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unavailable or he did not realize such evidence would help his claim.72 He
maintained that he had evidence of some details, such as sending money
to his father, but did not explain why he failed to provide it to the court.73
Following the hearing, the IJ denied the applicant’s application for
withholding of removal and protection under CAT.74
Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Ren,75 the applicant appealed,
arguing that the IJ should have automatically continued the hearing so
that he could obtain the necessary corroborating evidence before the final
judgment was issued.76 The BIA rejected this position based on its
interpretation of its earlier opinion, Matter of S-M-J-.77 According to the
L-A-C- court, S-M-J- did not explicitly state that an IJ must notify an
applicant of the need for corroboration before rendering a decision.78
Instead, S-M-J- held that the burden was on the applicant to corroborate
any evidence that could reasonably be expected, even if her claim was
otherwise credible.79
Furthermore, the BIA reasoned in L-A-C- that Congress’s purpose in
enacting the REAL ID Act was to “allow Immigration Judges to follow
commonsense standards in assessing asylum claims without undue
restrictions.”80 The Board reasoned that surely Congress could not have
intended to create even more procedural requirements for courts to
follow.81 Although the BIA conceded that it was “good practice” for an IJ
to give notice, especially in cases involving pro se applicants, the BIA
was unwilling to extend application of the REAL ID Act’s corroboration
provision any further.82 Therefore, the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision not to
continue proceedings and to deport the applicant based on his failure to
produce corroborating evidence.83
C. Wambura v. Barr
In Wambura v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit held that advance notice of the
need for corroborating evidence is not required before an IJ renders a final

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Yaogang Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011).
Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 517; See Ren, 648 F.3d at 1079.
Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 519; In Re S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. at 724.
Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 519.
Id.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 521 n. 3
Id. at 527.
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decision on asylum,84 siding with the BIA and Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. Wambura was an immigrant from
Tanzania who became a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. in 2005.
Less than a decade later, he pled guilty to “conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, aggravated identity theft and conspiracy to commit wire and mail
fraud.”85 The Department of Homeland Security then initiated removal
proceedings against him pursuant to the Immigration Naturalization Act
(“INA”).86 The INA provided that lawful permanent residents may be
removed when convicted of such crimes.87 To avoid deportation,
Wambura applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under CAT.88
Wambura testified that he would likely be tortured if he re-entered
Tanzania because he was a known and active member of Chadema, an
opposition political party in the country.89 While in the U.S., he alleged
that he served as a leader in Chadema USA and organized protests which
criticized the results of various Tanzanian elections.90 Additionally, he
alleged that he wrote letters to the United Nations and maintained a blog
about human rights issues in the country.91 He acknowledged that his
participation ended five years ago when he went to prison for the crimes
permitting his deportation.92 However, he asserted that his father had
recently told him that secret police officers were following him in
Tanzania.93 Therefore, Wambura maintained that his prior activities made
him a likely target for Tanzanian authorities.94
At a preliminary hearing, the IJ asked Wambura if he could corroborate
his testimony.95 Wambura said he was unable to provide corroborating
evidence because he was unable to access his email account while in
detention.96 The IJ denied all of his claims for being “totally and

84. Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 374 (4th Cir. 2020).
85. Id. at 367.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Due to the nature of his convictions and their corresponding sentences, an IJ later
determined that Wambura was disqualified from seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and
withholding of removal under CAT. Therefore, the only relief he could pursue was a deferral of removal
under CAT. Deferral of removal is “a more temporary form of relief” than withholding of removal under
CAT because this “status can be terminated more quickly and easily than withholding of removal if the
individual is no longer likely to be tortured […] in their home country.” Neilson et al., supra note 18.
89. Wambura, 980 F.3d at 367-68.
90. Id. at 367.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 368.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 376.
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completely based on speculation.”97 Specifically, the IJ noted that
Wambura failed to provide a letter or any other evidence of being tracked
by the secret police.98 Additionally, the IJ noted that no Chadema
members in the U.S. offered statements that the immigrant was actively a
part of the group.99 Wambura appealed the IJ’s decision. However, the
BIA agreed with the IJ and dismissed his claims, finding him ineligible
for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under CAT.100 He then
petitioned for judicial review of the BIA’s decision and argued that the IJ
should have given him notice of the need for corroborating evidence prior
to rendering the final decision on his claims.101
The Fourth Circuit ultimately held that the IJ was under no such
obligation.102 Instead, it argued that the REAL ID Act was silent on the
issue of whether notice of the need for corroboration must be given.103
The court then applied Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., where the Supreme Court instructed courts to:
Initially examine the statute’s plain language; if Congress has spoken
clearly on the precise question at issue, the statutory language controls. If,
however, the statute is silent or ambiguous, [courts should] defer to the
agency’s interpretation if it is reasonable.104

Because the BIA, an important subset of the Department of Justice,
previously interpreted the REAL ID Act’s corroboration provision in
Matter of L-A-C-, the Fourth Circuit concluded that this interpretation
controlled so long as it was reasonable.105
In determining that the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable, the court
first examined the BIA’s reasoning in Matter of L-A-C-, where it held that
Congress’s intent behind the REAL ID Act was to codify the standards
set forth by the BIA in Matter of S-M-J-.106 According to the Fourth
Circuit, Matter of S-M-J- did not require an IJ to provide advance notice
of the need for corroborating evidence or grant an automatic continuance
for the immigrant to obtain the necessary evidence. Rather, it interpreted
the opinion to merely direct that IJs give immigrants an opportunity to
explain why the relevant evidence was not initially obtained and include

97. Id. at 368.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 374.
103. Id. at 372.
104. Id. at 372 (quoting Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132, 137 (4th Cir. 2009)); Chevron. v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
105. Wambura, 980 F.3d at 372.
106. Id.; In Re S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997).
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this explanation in the record.107 Ultimately, it was within the IJ’s
discretion to extend the immigrant an opportunity to corroborate his
testimony or not.108
Agreeing with the BIA and the majority of other circuits, the Fourth
Circuit found allowing IJs such discretion to be reasonable because
immigrants “already had notice about the potential need for corroborating
evidence.”109 This notice came in the form of the instructions on the Form
1-589 application for asylum and withholding of removal, which directs
immigrants to “provide evidence of general conditions in the country
from which the applicant is seeking asylum or other protection and
specific facts to support the claim.”110 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit
argued that The REAL ID Act itself, with the inclusion of a corroboration
provision, provided immigrants with notice of the potential need for
corroborating evidence.111 Although the Fourth Circuit conceded that it
remained good practice for IJs to notify immigrants of the need for
corroboration before denying their pleas for asylum, the court ultimately
dismissed the notion that the IJ was under a strict obligation to do so.112
In rejecting the Third and Ninth Circuits’ conclusions that IJs are
required to provide notice of the need and opportunity to provide
corroborating evidence before rendering a decision, the Fourth Circuit
drew from prior circuit-majority opinions on the issue.113 The court
borrowed language from the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Gaye v. Lynch and
asserted that “[e]ven if it could be said that the statute is silent on the
issue, and thus possibly could allow for such a construction… it is plainly
erroneous to say that the statute unambiguously mandates such notice.”114
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit endorsed the Second Circuit’s reasoning in
Liu v. Holder, where the Second Circuit argued that “an IJ may not
determine that corroboration is necessary until all the evidence is in, and
the IJ has had an opportunity to weigh the evidence and prepare an
opinion…”115 Relying on these arguments, the Fourth Circuit held that
the BIA’s interpretation of the corroboration provision was reasonable
and should be upheld.116
Although the Fourth Circuit affirmed that the IJ did not err by failing
to provide Wambura with advance notice of the need for corroboration,
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 373.
Id. (quoting Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519, 530 (6th Cir. 2015)).
Id. (quoting Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009)).
Id. at 374.
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the Fourth Circuit found that the IJ failed to make the requisite finding on
whether the evidence was reasonably available to him.117 Consequently,
the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion, ultimately delaying Wambura’s removal from the U.S.118
Judge Harris wrote a concurrence in which she agreed with the
majority’s conclusion that “the IJ was required to—but did not—
determine whether [Wambura] had given ‘otherwise credible testimony,’
and, if so, whether he could ‘reasonably obtain’ the corroborating
evidence…” She argued, however, that the majority should have stopped
there.119 Judge Harris explained that the circuit split at issue in the
majority opinion was never implicated because the immigrant failed to
specifically request a continuance to obtain the missing evidence
identified by the judge.120 Instead, the immigrant merely explained that
he could not obtain the evidence when the IJ pressed him on its absence.121
In so doing, he did not imply that the evidence was forthcoming.122 Based
on these facts, Judge Harris asserted that the IJ’s decision whether to issue
a continuance was “beside the point.”123 All the IJ needed to do was
evaluate the immigrant’s explanation for why the evidence was
missing.124 Therefore, she would have avoided “deepening the circuit
split” in the majority’s opinion by side-stepping the issue.125
III. DISCUSSION
Federal circuit courts agree that it is good practice for IJs to give
immigrants notice of the need for corroboration and an opportunity to
provide corroborating evidence before rendering a final decision on
asylum.126 The remaining question, however, is whether they should be
required to do so. This Part argues that even if the congressional intent
behind the language of the REAL ID Act’s corroboration provision is
ambiguous, the provision is meaningless unless immigrants are first given
proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to present the corroboration
requested by the IJ. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the Fourth Circuit’s
recent interpretation of this provision in Wambura is not practical or
reasonable given the present dynamics of U.S. immigration courts.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 375.
Id. at 375-76.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Id. at 372.; Ren, 648 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Section A of this Part considers the challenging circumstances that pro
se applicants for asylum encounter, which make the Fourth Circuit’s
holding in Wambura particularly unreasonable. Section B weighs
immigrants’ need for added procedural safeguards during the asylum
process against the court’s interests in expediently resolving cases and
explains how courts may account for both of these interests. Finally,
Section C argues that, although the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
REAL ID Act has merit, other circuits and ultimately the Supreme Court
of the United States, should endorse the narrower arguments made by the
Third Circuit in Saravia. That approach provides the best
counterargument to the Fourth Circuit’s assertion that an immigrant is not
entitled to notice of the need for corroboration or an opportunity to
provide corroborating evidence before her plea for asylum is rejected.
A. Difficulties Experienced by Pro Se Applicants During the Process for
Asylum
Whether immigrants obtain or forego assistance of counsel strongly
influences the outcomes of cases in removal proceedings.127 Immigrants
with counsel are more likely to prevail on their claims in the end and
pursue defenses such as asylum in the first place.128 In 2016, the National
Immigration Counsel reported that detained immigrants who retained
counsel were eleven times more likely to apply for asylum than their pro
se counterparts.129 Moreover, non-detained immigrants with counsel were
five times more likely to apply for asylum.130 These statistics may suggest
that a significant number of pro se immigrants with meritorious asylum
claims fail to raise such claims. This is likely because some immigrants
do not understand how to raise the asylum defense or are unaware of the
defense altogether.
Unfortunately, the odds are stacked against pro se immigrants even
when they do raise a claim for asylum.131 Few immigrants are native
English speakers and, as a result, language barriers often add a layer of
complexity for them when representing their interests.132 Although having
an interpreter present throughout the case helps alleviate this issue, it does
not entirely diminish the risk of miscommunication or oversight.133 For

127. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 8.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Ramón & Reyes, supra note 10; National Immigrant Justice Center, Access to Counsel,
https://immigrantjustice.org/issues/access-counsel, (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).
133. Id.
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example, consider an interpreter who assists an immigrant with the Form
1-589 application for asylum, which must be completed in English.134 The
interpreter is neither responsible nor likely to know which parts of the
Form 1-589 are most important for the immigrant to understand.
Therefore, even though this form briefly mentions that applicants may
need to provide corroborating evidence before winning their case, it is
entirely possible that the interpreter could rush through or neglect this
language when explaining the form to the immigrant.
In addition to arguing that the Form 1-589 provides immigrants subject
to removal proceedings with sufficient notice of the need for
corroboration, the Fourth Circuit in Wambura also argued that the REAL
ID Act provides immigrants with this advance notice.135 However, few
individuals—aside from legal professionals and politicians—know that
the REAL ID Act exists, and even fewer know what information the Act
contains. Especially with regard to immigrants who demonstrate a limited
proficiency in English, it is unreasonable to expect them to seek out this
Act, know which provision is relevant to their case, and then translate it.
As a result, the Form 1-589, REAL ID Act, and other government texts
likely fail to deliver actual notice of important requirements, such as the
need for corroboration, in a number of asylum cases.
Approximately fifty-six percent of immigrants subject to removal
proceedings also struggle to defend their interests because they were
detained by the government in prisons, jails, and detention centers for
their entire case.136 Obtaining counsel from behind bars is extremely
difficult for many individuals because they cannot freely travel to meet
with an attorney and, even when they can find an attorney, must often rely
on telephone calls in lieu of in-person meetings.137 Furthermore, unlike
the U.S. criminal justice system, which requires defendants to be tried in
the location of the offense, immigrants are often transported to detention
facilities hundreds of miles away from their homes and families where
they are forced to undergo court proceedings in new locations alone.138
Because hiring an immigration attorney is costly, the distance between a
detained immigrant and her family further complicates her ability to
obtain counsel because detainees are generally inhibited from earning
wages.139 Detained immigrants also struggle to collect evidence to

134. I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/i-589, (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).
135. Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 372 (4th Cir. 2020).
136. Another 10% of immigrants spent some time behind bars during their case but were released
prior to their final hearing. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 8.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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corroborate their claims because of their inability to participate in the
outside world.140 Wambura provides a helpful example: Wambura alleged
that his detention precluded him from accessing his email account to
obtain the requested corroborating evidence.141 It is possible that
Wambura’s inability to access this evidence substantially harmed his
chances against deportation.
Adopting the Third and Ninth Circuit’s application of the REAL ID
Act’s corroboration provision does not alone solve the challenges
immigrants must overcome to achieve asylum. However, it is a small, yet
important step towards ensuring that immigrants are given a meaningful
opportunity to defend their case against well-prepared government
lawyers. In addition to the problems created by language barriers and
immigrants’ likelihood of being detained, few immigrants comprehend
how the asylum process works and what is expected of them.142 Although
IJs may view it as an obvious expectation that immigrants should be
prepared to corroborate their testimony, this expectation is not always
clear to immigrants unfamiliar with the U.S. immigration system. Most
immigrants do not have legal training and therefore cannot anticipate
when they will need corroborating evidence to back up their testimonies.
Moreover, when IJs fail to specify the additional evidence needed,
immigrants may innocently believe that the evidence is not important to
their case.143 Not only can such misunderstandings be disastrous to an
immigrant’s plea for asylum, but they undermine an immigration court’s
ability to fairly adjudicate claims. A notice requirement will ultimately
lead to more immigrants providing relevant and persuasive evidence to
support their pleas for asylum, allowing IJs to make more informed
decisions regarding whether an immigrant should be granted asylum.
Immigrants with counsel should also be afforded notice of the need for
corroboration and an opportunity to provide the evidence before an IJ
rules on their pleas for asylum. A recent survey of judges conducted by
Richard Posner and Albert Yoon reported that immigration law was the
practice area in which the quality of legal services was the lowest. 144
Another survey of IJs in New York reported that approximately 50% of
the lawyers appearing before them provided their clients with “either
140. Id.
141. Wambura, 980 F.3d at 376.
142. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 8.
143. For example, the immigrant in Saravia v. Attorney General of the United States alleged that a
primary reason the corroboration identified by the judge was not introduced was because he was not told
to do so and therefore did not realize the evidence needed to be introduced. 905 F.3d 729, 732 (3d Cir.
2018).
144. Benjamin Edwards & Brian L. Frye, It’s Hard out there for an immigrant; lemon lawyers make
it harder, THE HILL (Jan. 19, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/369702-its-hard-out-therefor-an-immigrant-lemon-lawyers-make-it-harder.
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inadequate or grossly inadequate representation, and the worst lawyers
actually make their clients worse off.”145 Substantiating these findings, a
2015 study on asylum cases reported that the bottom 10% of immigration
lawyers “actually reduced the chance of relief so much that the applicant
would have been better off without a lawyer.”146
Immigrants who hire attorneys rarely have the legal knowledge to
evaluate whether an attorney’s services are benefitting their case. Steps
such as requiring IJs to provide immigrants with notice of the need for
corroboration ultimately bridge this gap by allowing immigrants to
become more involved in their cases. Therefore, with notice of the need
for corroboration, immigrants may be less dependent on their attorneys
and able to rectify their attorneys’ mistakes by producing their own
corroborating evidence.
Requiring IJs to provide such notice and opportunity will help address
inequities within the U.S. immigration system. Notice and opportunity
requirements would afford immigrants, especially pro se immigrants, an
added procedural safeguard to ensure a fair opportunity to present their
best cases for asylum. In the U.S. criminal justice system, all defendants
have the right to a government-appointed attorney because of the severity
of the charges and corresponding sentences brought against them.
Although the right to appointed counsel is not recognized within the U.S.
immigration system, it is important to note that the consequences faced
by asylum-seekers can be just as, if not more, severe than the
consequences faced by defendants in criminal proceedings. Many
immigrants who apply for asylum sincerely believe they will be harmed
by returning to their home countries. Moreover, being indefinitely
separated from one’s home and family is an emotionally painful situation
for anyone to endure. Given these factors, IJs should take reasonable
steps, such as providing notice of the need for corroboration, to ensure
that immigrants are not unduly disadvantaged in the courtroom.
B. Weighing the Interests of Immigrants and the Courts
Although it is clear that immigrants applying for asylum would benefit
from additional procedural safeguards, the BIA in Matter of L-A-Cargued that IJs should be able to follow commonsense standards without
undue restrictions.147 Ultimately, the majority circuits are weary about

145. Id.
146. Id.; See Banks Miller et al., Leveling the Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal Representation in
Cases of Asymmetrical Capability, 49 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 209 (2015),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/lasr.12123?casa_token=gzfdjQuj2aEAAAAA:oKcuE4WN5RWVhCiEsNeAbkZGu5im6hqHlUhnFy7K67hYGX1Acec-utb_kqcYUrb7utJIfE8xQdycWkP.
147. 26 I&N Dec. 516, 520 (B.I.A. 2015).
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overburdening IJs with additional procedural requirements, which could
delay asylum cases on already crowded dockets.148 In fact, some IJs are
so overwhelmed by their caseload that they reported “seven minutes on
average to decide a case, if they decided each case schedule for a hearing
before them that day.”149 Although expediency is a legitimate concern
given the hundreds of thousands of cases pending in U.S. immigration
courts, the legitimacy of the system is severely undermined when rushed
processes lead to unjust results. Not only are IJs more likely to make
significant errors when they are forced to quickly deliver complex legal
decisions, but they risk failing to fully develop the record in the process.150
This causes more complications in the appeals that inevitably follow.151
Furthermore, the objective to expediently resolve asylum cases gained
traction under the Trump Administration, under which the Department of
Justice “imposed case-completion quotas” and tied IJs’ “individual
performance reviews to the number of cases they complete.”152 These
schemes deter IJs from carefully reviewing asylum claims before
rendering what could be the most consequential decision in an
immigrant’s life. Although the Biden Administration pledged to roll back
many of Trump’s policies targeting asylum-seekers, such policies take
significant time to replace and run the risk of being reinstated by later
administrations.153 Therefore, unless the political landscape shifts,
immigration courts arguably prioritize expediency to the detriment of the
court system’s integrity.
Requiring IJs to pause in their analysis of a case to provide notice of
the need for corroboration and an opportunity to provide corroborating
evidence should be a priority because it will naturally lead to the
introduction of more evidence in removal proceedings, allowing IJs to
make more informed decisions regarding asylum. The present dynamics
of the U.S. immigration courts already pressure IJs to rush through every
stage of an asylum case to reach a verdict. Although collecting evidence
is time-consuming, notice requirements would allow immigrants to
understand what evidence an IJ needs and plan accordingly. Moreover, it

148. See Id.
149. Empty Benches: Underfunding of Immigration Courts Undermines Justice, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Jun 17, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org
/research/empty-benches-underfunding-immigration-courts-undermines-justice.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Over 50 Rights Groups Call on Congress to Establish an Independent Immigration Court,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/18/over-50-rightsgroups-call-congress-establish-independent-immigration-court#.
153. Rebecca Beitsch, Biden Struggles to Unravel Web of Trump Immigration Rules, THE HILL
(Mar. 14, 2021), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/543041-biden-officials-struggle-tounravel-web-of-trump-immigration-rules?rl=1.
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would reduce the risk of “gotcha” moments, which were identified by the
Third Circuit in Saravia, when an IJ hands down a final judgment denying
asylum.154 Due process mandates that immigrants who have access to
evidence determinative to their case be able to provide such evidence.
However, if immigrants are not put on notice of the need to produce it,
they may not understand that the evidence is even desired by the court.
Therefore, a notice requirement will ultimately benefit both immigrants
and the courts because it would encourage informed decision-making in
light of the hardships faced by immigrants during the asylum process.
Requiring IJs to provide notice of the need for corroboration would
begin to balance the scales between immigrants and the government.
Therefore, this step is not only good practice but necessary to ensure that
immigrants have a genuine opportunity to plead their case. This does not
mean, however, that the U.S. immigration system’s need for expediency
should be forgotten altogether. In her Wambura concurrence, Judge
Harris argued that, because Wambura never asked for a continuance, the
IJ only needed to evaluate Wambura’s explanation for why the evidence
was missing.155 Unlike the majority, she would not have entertained the
idea of issuing a continuance for him to obtain the missing evidence.156
Although Wambura implied that some requested evidence was previously
beyond his reach, he never said that he would be unable to corroborate his
claims if the case were continued.157 In fact, Wambura may not have
known that a continuance allowing him to collect the evidence was even
an option. For these reasons, Judge Harris’s approach is somewhat
unforgiving to immigrants who do not understand the innerworkings of
immigration courts.
However, Judge Harris’s concurrence raises a compelling point. If an
immigrant testifies that the corroborating evidence requested by the IJ
was unavailable prior to the hearing and would not, under any
circumstances, become available in the future, then it makes no sense for
an IJ to continue the case for the sole purpose of allowing the immigrant
to obtain the evidence. Instead, the IJ should merely consider the
immigrant’s explanation for why the evidence is unavailable and include
it in the record before issuing a final decision. This approach echoes the
instruction of Matter of S-M-J-: when corroborating evidence is
unavailable, “the applicant must explain its unavailability and the [IJ]
must ensure that the applicant’s explanation is included in the record.”158
IJs could then more efficiently manage their dockets by only continuing
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Saravia, 905 F.3d 729, 738 (3d Cir. 2018).
Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 376 (4th Cir. 2020).
Id.
Id. at 374.
In Re S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 1997).
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the cases that would truly benefit from it. Although affording immigrants
more time to collect evidence often outweighs concerns regarding
expedience, there are times when the opposite is true. When an immigrant
testifies that the evidence in question will never become available, the IJ
should be permitted to issue a decision without delay, so long as the
immigrant’s explanation for why the evidence is unobtainable is carefully
considered.
C. The Statutory Text of the REAL ID Act and the Practical Effects of
the Majority Interpretation
The Third and Ninth Circuits both argue that IJs should be required to
give notice of the need for corroboration and an opportunity to provide
corroborating evidence before rendering a final decision on asylum.
However, the Ninth Circuit’s justification for this policy is much broader.
In Ren, the court first explained that a plain reading of the REAL ID Act’s
statutory text mandates this notice.159 Next, the court explained that the
REAL ID Act’s requirement that IJs detail in the record why the
immigrant is missing corroborating evidence lacks substance if
immigrants are not first affirmatively given an opportunity to provide
such evidence.160 Though the Third Circuit agreed with the Ninth
Circuit’s second argument, it declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s view
that the REAL ID Act unambiguously required IJs to provide immigrants
with this notice and opportunity.161
The Ninth Circuit’s textual interpretation of the REAL ID Act’s
corroboration provision is not unreasonable. Notably, it pointed out that
Congress chose to use future-directed and imperative language when
instructing immigrants to provide the evidence in question.162 For
example, the REAL ID Act states that immigrants “should provide”
corroborating evidence when requested by an IJ and that evidence “must
be provided” unless it is unobtainable.163 This implies a much different
meaning than if the statute had instead been written to retroactively clarify
that immigrants “should have” provided corroborating evidence when
requested by an IJ, and such evidence “must have been provided” unless
it was unobtainable. If Congress wanted to avoid requiring IJs to provide
notice, this past-tense language would more clearly establish its intent. By
using future-oriented language, however, Congress arguably suggested a
future opportunity for immigrants to present evidence to the IJ.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Yaogang Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1092.
Saravia, 905 F.3d at 738.
Ren, 648 F.3d at 1091.
Id.
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Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress unambiguously
expressed its intent that immigrants be given a future opportunity to
produce corroborating evidence.164
But the mere existence of the circuit split regarding the REAL ID Act’s
corroboration provision indicates its ambiguity. The Fourth Circuit,
joined by five other circuits and the BIA, argued that Congress’s intent
cannot be ascertained from the language itself.165 Moreover, the Third
Circuit declined to take up the issue when it rejected the majority circuit
approach.166 To further evince the statute’s ambiguity, consider a reader
who interprets the statute to mean that immigrants should provide
corroboration during the same hearing the evidence was requested by the
IJ. Although this interpretation does not make sense in terms of
facilitating judicial review, the statutory text, taken at face value, does not
unambiguously contradict such an understanding. Therefore, other
circuits as well as the Supreme Court should instead adopt the Third
Circuit’s narrower arguments focused on judicial review concerns
regarding when notice of the need for corroboration is not given. Many
of these arguments are also endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in Ren.167
In Saravia, the Third Circuit argued that applying the BIA’s
interpretation that the REAL ID Act did not require IJs to provide notice
and opportunity would severely undermine appellate review of their
decisions.168 According to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4), appellate courts may
not reverse “a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the
availability of corroborating evidence… unless the court finds [. . .] that
a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating
evidence is unavailable.”169 However, in order to determine whether the
IJ’s conclusion was reasonable, the record must be sufficiently developed.
This not only requires an IJ to consider whether the evidence in question
was introduced to the court but whether the immigrant could have
obtained the evidence.
The BIA and majority circuit approach ultimately fails to recognize the
significance and application of the second question. If an IJ only
introduces into the record that an immigrant failed to provide the
corroborating evidence and does not ask her if the evidence was available
to her, an appellate court cannot meet the requirements of 8 U.S.C. §
164. Id. at 1091-92.
165. See Ren, 648 F.3d at 1082; Saravia, 905 F.3d at 731; Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.
2009); Wambura, 980 F.3d at 376; Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2020); Gaye v. Lynch,
788 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2015); Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2008); Uzodinma v. Barr, 951
F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2020).
166. Saravia, 905 F.3d at 738.
167. See Ren, 648 F.3d at 1092-93.
168. Saravia, 905 F.3d at 737-38.
169. Id. at 736.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 9

“YOU SHOULD HAVE KNOWN”

2021]

709

1252(b)(4). In Wambura, the Fourth Circuit ultimately agreed that lower
immigration courts were subject to this duty.170 Even though the court
held that IJs were under no obligation to provide advance notice and an
opportunity to produce corroborating evidence before rendering its final
decision, it remanded the case because, on appeal, the IJ and BIA failed
to inquire as to whether the evidence was even available in the first
place.171 However, it would not have made sense to ask Wambura whether
or why the evidence was unavailable to him if he was not even notified
that he needed to provide it. This begs the question of how the
immigration court system would benefit from appellate courts learning
that corroborating evidence was available even though IJs were
purportedly under no obligation to continue the case for immigrants to
obtain it.
To highlight this point, consider the immigrant in Saravia, who was
asked by the IJ why his mother had not yet testified in his favor.172 He
responded that he never knew that his mother needed to testify and was
constrained by time and resources to further corroborate his testimony.173
However, his mother was waiting outside of the courtroom when this
exchange occurred.174 This explanation, combined with the
circumstances, clarifies that the evidence sought by the IJ could be
introduced so long as the immigrant was given a future opportunity to do
so. Given the high stakes in asylum cases, it would have been unjust for
the Third Circuit to hold that the lower court was not required to give the
immigrant an opportunity to provide corroborating evidence now that he
was aware of its influence on the outcome of his case.
Ultimately, IJs must provide notice and an opportunity for immigrants
to produce corroborating evidence to ensure that immigrants with
legitimate asylum claims are not deported and put in harm’s way. U.S.
circuit courts and the Supreme Court should therefore adopt the Third
Circuit’s argument that the majority circuit approach impedes judicial
review in an already overburdened system where errors are bound to
occur. Based on this argument, the majority’s interpretation of the REAL
ID Act’s corroboration provision is unreasonable, and future courts need
not rely on the questionable idea that the REAL ID Act was
unambiguously written to produce such an unjust result.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 375 (4th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 375-76.
Saravia, 905 F.3d at 738.
Id. at 738-39.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Today, immigrants subject to deportation proceedings face numerous
obstacles when raising the asylum defense. Most notably, many
immigrants are unable to obtain competent legal representation because
of their financial insecurities or detainments in remote locations.
Furthermore, the various complexities embedded in the asylum process,
in addition to language barriers, often exacerbate immigrants’ troubling
circumstances. Requiring that IJs provide immigrants notice of the need
for corroboration and an opportunity to provide corroborating evidence
affords immigrants an additional procedural safeguard that ultimately
begins to reduce the present inequities in the U.S. immigration system.
Additionally, notice and opportunity requirements facilitate the
introduction of persuasive evidence, allowing IJs to make more informed
decisions less likely to be disturbed on appeal. Therefore, the U.S.
Supreme Court and other circuit courts should adopt the Third Circuit’s
argument that requiring IJs to provide notice and opportunity not only
promotes fairness but is imperative for meaningful judicial review.
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